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ApproACh
This report was prepared by Patrick Williams and Eric Kind with the support of the Open Society 
Foundations. The project was managed by Rebekah Delsol, from the Open Society Justice 
Initiative, and Becky Hogge, from the Open Society Foundations. The report benefited from the 
advice and guidance of an advisory panel consisting of:
Rosamunde von Brakel, Vrije Universiteit Brussel
Sarah Chander, European Network Against Racism
Hannah Couchman, Liberty
Lina Dencik, Cardiff University
Claire Fernandez, EDRi
Joshua Franco, Amnesty International UK
Vera Franz, Open Society Foundations
Katrina Ffrench, StopWatch
William Isaac, DeepMind
Fieke Jansen, Cardiff University
Gerbrig Klos, Amnesty International NL
Michael Shiner, London School of Economics
Eric Töpfer, Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte
A meeting of the advisory board members helped shape the direction of the report, and a 
convening of anti-racist advocates and campaigners provided feedback to the key messages of 
the report which were presented by the authors. A number of interviews with advisory board 
members helped provide key information, particularly about practices in different jurisdictions, 
which underpinned the research findings of the report. 
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Foreword
We, as activists, as anti-racist organisations, and as racialised communities in 
Europe, know too well what it means to be over-policed and under-protected. 
Still, in 2019, we feel the need to evidence racial profiling, to contest 
narratives placing us as a threat to ‘security’ and essentially to unsettle 
presumptions as to our criminality.
We are still mastering the techniques with which we contest over-policing, 
brutality and racial profiling. We must now contend with another challenge. 
When law enforcement resorts to new technology to aid their practice, we 
find ourselves at further risk. Not only must we consider our physical safety 
in our relations with the authorities, we also need to be informed about the 
security of our data.
The use of systems to profile, to surveil and to provide a logic to 
discrimination is not new. What is new is the sense of neutrality afforded to 
data-driven policing. This report opens a conversation between all those 
invested in anti-racism, data privacy and non-discrimination in general. It is 
crucial that we use our collective knowledge to resist. 
Karen Taylor, Chair, 
European Network Against Racism (ENAR)
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IntroduCtIon
Across Europe we are witnessing the increased use of technologies to 
assist policing and wider law enforcement practices. While some of these 
technologies are not new, law enforcement’s increased resort to data sharing 
and analytics, and predictive policing tools to direct policing resources has 
concerning implications for minority ethnic and marginalised communities.  
Law enforcement agencies present technology as ‘race’ neutral, independent of bias, and objective in their 
endeavour to prevent crime and offending behaviour. Such claims overlook the overwhelming evidence of 
discriminatory policing against racialised minority and migrant communities across Europe. For people of African, 
Arab, Asian and Roma descent, alongside religious minority communities, encounters with law enforcement 
agencies of many European countries are higher than for majority white populations. Whether in interactions with 
the police or numbers in prisons, European criminal justice systems are policing minority groups according to myths 
and stereotypes about the level of ‘risk’ they pose, rather than their behaviour.  
This report explains the potential effects of the increased use of data-driven technologies for minority groups 
and communities. It combines our collective understanding of criminological processes of criminalisation with 
information about the incursion of new technologies into contemporary policing. There is an urgency to consider 
the potential (mis)uses of data-driven police technologies for racialised minority groups. At present, we face (public 
and private) organisational silences that conceal technology from public scrutiny and accountability. This is further 
complicated through ongoing debates concerning the reliability, validity and/or ethics of data use upon which much 
of these new tools are based. 
Within this report, ‘hardwiring’ refers to the process of incorporating historical and prospective police and law 
enforcement data into technology to support the policing function. We argue in this report that the introduction of 
new technology is negatively impacting ethnic minority communities in three ways:
1
The impact of new 
technologies to identify, 
surveil and analyse will 
be disproportionately 
felt by minority ethnic 
communities, as they are 
already over-policed. This 
includes crime-analytics as 
well as the use of mobile 
fingerprinting scanners, 
social media monitoring 
and mobile phone 
extraction among others.
2
Many algorithmically driven 
identification technologies 
disproportionately mis-identify 
people from black and other 
minority ethnic groups. For 
communities that are already 
over-policed, such technological 
limitations, found for example 
in facial recognition, will 
increase further the likelihood 
of discriminatory stop and 
search, due to technological 
misidentification(s). 
3
Finally, predictive policing systems are 
likely to present geographic areas and 
communities with a high proportion 
of minority ethnic people as ‘risky’ 
and subsequently, foci for police 
attention. Predictive policing systems, 
responding to calls for improvements in 
crime detection, have been developed 
based upon data that reflects ethnic 
profiling and racist policing. This will 
result advertently in the ‘hardwiring’ of 
historical racist policing into present day 
police and law enforcement practice.
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The presence of new technologies both assists and drives over-policing by providing law enforcement agencies with 
risk-making capabilities, alongside developing databases which contain racialised stereotypical assumptions of 
minority communities.1
The report has three main sections. Firstly, we set out disparities in policing based on ethnic, nationality and 
religious categories across Europe. We take as our starting point ethnic profiling as intrinsic to European law 
enforcement practices and in so doing utilise key concepts such as suspicion, risk and ‘risk-making’, and the 
racialised tendencies of criminalisation. 
The second section gives a high level overview of the ‘surveillance industry’ responsible for developing policing 
technologies, with a discussion of its role in the policing eco-system, and their claims of scientific objectivity and 
technological (‘race’ and ethnic) neutrality. We introduce a broad spectrum of policing technologies, conceptually 
grouped as identification technologies; data harvesting and network mapping technologies; database fusion, 
enrichment and analysis tools; and then predictive policing tools. We include discussion of facial recognition, 
automatic number plate recognition, voice print identification, finger-print identification, social media monitoring, 
the use of telephone call detail records, mobile phone extraction, IMSI catchers, body worn cameras, data sharing 
and the creation of new databases, and both person based and place based predictive policing tools.  
We feature case studies throughout to emphasise particular practice by a police force in a certain country serving to 
highlight the implications of data-driven technologies for maintaining racial profiling and discriminatory policing 
practices. In noting the cumulative and racialising risk-making effects of data-driven technology, we focus attention 
on technologies that drive the ‘criminalising communities’ and ‘crime anticipation systems’.    
We envisage that this report will help set out the basic information about the harms of racialised police practices 
and the potentially harmful effects that data-driven technologies present. The report concludes by identifying some 
future challenges and opportunities for activism, areas that need further research, and recommendations for action 
as initial steps in building resistance against the hardwiring of discriminatory policing practices across Europe. 
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rACIAl dIspArIty In polICIng
ethnic, nationality and religious 
disparity across europe
Across Europe, minority ethnic groups 
and communities consistently report 
experiences of over-policing by police and 
law enforcement agencies. Most recently, 
the UK government commissioned Lammy 
Review confirmed the existence of a ‘racial 
disparity’ characterised by increased rates 
of stop and search, prosecution, punishment 
and imprisonment for minority groups 
and communities when compared to the 
‘majority’ population.2 Such findings are 
clearly replicated across Europe where 
‘foreign nationals’ are over-represented in 
prisons (see chart below). 
Added to this, evidence from the EU Fundamental 
Rights Agency shows that 14% of respondents to the 
survey were stopped within the preceding 12 months, 
with 40% indicating this was due to their ‘immigrant 
or ethnic minority background’.3 In England and Wales, 
black people are more than nine times more likely to 
be stopped and searched by the police, a figure that 
increases to over twenty times in particular areas in 
England and Wales.4  Collectively, the ‘black’5 group 
were at greatest risk of being stopped and searched 
by the police - where in Austria, a majority (66%) of 
Sub-Saharan African respondents were stopped by the 
police within the preceding five year period. The same 
applies to 38% of black people in Finland and 30% in 
Lithuania. People of North African background were 
subject to significant levels of police stops in France 
(31%), Italy (32%), Netherlands (33%). For those of 
South Asian background in Greece, the figures are 
59%, in Cyprus 43% and 22% in Italy. Just under half of 
Roma people in Greece (47%) were stopped, with 46% 
of respondents in Spain, and 45% in Hungary.6 
Beyond the personal and emotional effects of over-
policing (to be discussed below), it is important 
to recognise the criminalising effects of targeted 
profiling. In particular, these practices afford the 
police and law enforcement agents with opportunities 
to gather information about certain communities 
based on the assumption that they present a 
heightened risk of criminal activity. By 2005, the UK 
government had established what was regarded as 
the largest DNA database in the world upon which the 
details of 135,000 black males aged between 15 and 
34 years of age were held, representing three-quarters 
(77%) of the overall database.7 On the one hand, this 
serves to illustrate the high levels of stop and search 
and the gathering of DNA information and further 
demonstrates the reality of ethnic profiling as an 
intrinsic feature of policing.  
To be stopped and searched and/or subject to 
over-policing is not a measure of criminality or the 
propensity to crime, but rather, the state’s formal 
response to (ethnic, religious and nationality) groups 
who are presented as ‘outsiders’ and as not belonging 
to the country within which they reside. Therefore, it is 
necessary to consider the conceptual ideas that drive 
the over-policing of minority groups.  
England & Wales 12%
Italy
Proportion (%) of ‘foreign nationals’ in prisons
France 19%
Germany 31%
Netherlands 19%
Spain 29%
33%
Source: Aebi, M.F. et al (2018) ‘Foreign offenders in prison and probation in Europe: Trends from 2005 to 2015 (inmates) and situation in 2015 
(inmates and probationers)’. University of Lausanne: Council of Europe.
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ethnic profiling drives the over-
policing of minority groups and 
communities
Dominant discourses on ethnic profiling 
often focus on (a) the inadequacy of 
monitoring and data collection practices by 
European law enforcement agencies and 
(b) the heterogeneity of racialised groups 
across Europe, which restricts the ability to 
develop and apply general explanations for 
stop and search practices across different 
European countries. 
While we accept the basis of such arguments, the 
everyday reality alongside the personal and emotional 
harms of intrusive policing practices have wider 
repercussions for minority groups and communities. 
There has long existed political anxieties that minority 
communities are responsible for driving up social 
problems, including crime and offending behaviour 
within European countries, with specific racial, 
ethnic and/or religious groups being pathologised as 
possessing and posing ‘risks’ of criminal activity due 
to either socio-economic status, cultural or religious 
differences and/or affiliations. However, evidence 
clearly shows that minority populations commit 
criminal offences at a similar, and more often than 
not, at a lower rate than the majority population.8  
Despite this, that particular groups are more likely 
to be stopped by police is better understood as a 
politically-sanctioned policed response to groups who 
law enforcement officers ‘suspect’ as being involved in 
criminal activity.  
Before moving on to discuss the surveillance industry 
the following will highlight the critical ideas which 
drive ethnic profiling and over-policing across Europe.  
In England and Wales, figures 
indicate that black people 
are more than nine times 
more likely to be stopped and 
searched by the police, a figure 
that increases to more than 
twenty times in particular 
areas in England and Wales.  
Greece 59%        Cyprus 43%        Italy 22% 
Austria 66% 
Finland 38%  
Netherlands 33%
% of respondents that were 
stopped by the police within 
the preceding five year period: 
Italy 32% 
France 31% 
Lithuania 30%
South Asian
Sub-Saharan African
Greece 47%        Spain 46%        Hungary 45% 
Roma 
To be stopped and searched then is not 
a random event, but a state driven daily 
occurrence for minority people across Europe. 
Of more concern, explanations of police racism 
and discriminatory law enforcement practices 
are increasingly concealed behind political 
claims of immigration control, the ‘cultural 
incompatibility’ of minorities in Europe and 
broader crime control (including serious 
violence, extremism, illegal immigration). 
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FROM SUSPICION TO RISK
I remember a time, I think it [was] Year 9  
or Year 10… I was getting stopped every 
week. Without a doubt, I’d get stopped all the time. 
At that time, I didn’t really chill in my area…[I]t was 
weird man. Starting to get stopped and searched all 
the time to the point where it became a joke. It was 
just a normal thing like putting on your clothes.9 
In assessing how law enforcement are using new 
technology to further embed racialised stereotypes 
and assumptions into policing practices, it is important 
to de-construct how data is used to construct ideas of 
‘suspicion’ and ‘risk’ for racialised communities. 
When you’re stopped when you’re not doing 
anything suspicious, and you’re stopped 
without the reason even being explained, that creates 
a really bad feeling. And you feel a lot of fear inside. You 
ask yourself, ‘Is there something wrong? Has someone 
said something about me? What is happening, exactly?’ 
A few hours afterwards, you’re still thinking about it, 
especially if they ask you for your name. You think, 
‘Well, what are they doing with my name? They think 
I did something? Why did they ask for my name, 
specifically? Am I going to be stopped somewhere else 
after that?10
Suspicion as a driver of police stop and search 
practice is well documented.13 Media representations 
and commentaries of ‘crime’ serve to amplify and 
communicate racist stereotypes which evoke and 
heighten the majority groups’ suspicion of racialised 
minority groups. 
There was a moment in which it didn’t affect 
me because it was so normalized, I saw it 
through this prism. ‘Well it’s normal, I am Gitano and 
that’s why they stop me.’ There is no documentation 
that can show that they stopped you for a racial 
profile if they say it’s routine, security, suspicion.11
Crime prevention and criminal law enforcement is 
increasingly discussed in terms of risk-management, 
characterised as the development of technology 
solutions alongside the introduction of actuarial forms 
of risk assessment to control specific groups of ‘risky’ 
people and to manage a plethora of risks assumed to 
be faced by the populations of advanced societies.14 
It is important to recognise that cultural depictions of 
crime and risk influence the reality of law enforcement 
and the construction and operation of risk categories. 
Of additional concern, algorithmic risk predictor tools 
are increasingly used to target groups and individuals 
who are calculated as posing a high level of risk who in 
turn are increasingly more likely to populate ‘suspect 
lists’ and to determine the level of punishment they 
will receive. 
During the checks, what do I think about? 
As it is, when this happens, there are always 
people walking around. People start staring at you. 
‘What is Adil doing with the police?’, ‘What are those 
guys doing with the police?’ or ‘What do the police 
want with them?’, ‘What have they done this time?’ 
How do the police see me? They just see me as a 
Moroccan, like all the other Moroccans, and that just 
makes you feel really bad. It’s like you have to scream 
for your rights even though they are doing you wrong. 
That feeling is really frustrating. It destroys something 
inside of you. I don’t feel protected by the police. It’s 
more like I feel I have to protect myself from them in 
some situations. They don’t listen to you as a citizen 
in those situations. It’s because people, the police, 
paint that picture again: ‘Yes, it’s a Moroccan.’12
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RACIALISED CRIMINALISATION
Recently, policing has drawn attention to specific 
youth behaviours as problematic. For example, while 
it is not a criminal offence to be in a ‘gang’, to appear 
in a Rap, Grime or Drill music video, or to perform in a 
music video, such behaviours are increasingly being 
viewed with suspicion of criminality. Criminologically, 
such behaviours have been understood as expressions 
of youth culture, youth political engagement and 
young people’s group-identity.  However, today such 
behaviours have been constructed as legitimate 
targets for policing and law enforcement surveillance. 
Law enforcement increasingly resort to social media 
to gather information about these behaviours. It 
was recently reported that the police are able to 
trawl social media for images and content, with such 
‘fishing’ activities generating vast data. In 2018, the 
London Metropolitan Police was reported as having a 
database of 1400 videos15 with Amnesty International 
suggesting that the content of this database is not 
always gathered using appropriate legal protections 
for human rights.
As part of racialised criminalisation, technology is 
being used by law enforcement agencies to support 
and justify the collection of ‘non-criminal’ information 
about individuals and their associations (friends, 
family members, romance links, etc.) who may engage 
in such behaviours. In turn, this data becomes central 
to profiling and intelligence building practices through 
the development of priority or suspect lists that 
include the identification and surveillance of racialised 
non-criminal individuals. The contentious practice of 
social media monitoring, facial recognition technology 
online and/or in public spaces, data capture through 
police body worn cameras, all contribute data to the 
development of such lists.  
The racialisation of specific crime-types and forms 
of offending behaviour are portrayed as specific to 
particular minority ethnic groups. Offence types 
such as drug dealing, theft, street robbery, religious 
extremism, radicalisation, street gangs, serious violent 
crime (knife crime) are (wrongly) communicated as 
particular to minority ethnic groups and communities. 
Within a number of European jurisdictions, young 
black and brown people are increasingly being 
targeted and registered onto police gang databases 
as ‘suspects’ or gang nominals which advertently 
marks them out for police attention and increased 
police encounters.16 Academics have long argued that 
the racialisation of gangs creates ‘useful enemies’ 
who have become ‘a lightning rod for broader 
social anxieties during moments of [national] 
uncertainty, resulting in intensive securitisation 
and efforts at moral regulation’.17 Similarly, the 
particular law enforcement attention upon Muslim 
communities across Europe as posing a ‘risk’ of 
extremism and radicalisation again serves to illustrate 
how racialised criminalisation has facilitated the 
introduction of technologically driven policing, which 
disproportionality impacts religious minority people 
and communities.  
Criminalisation refers to a process where 
law enforcement agencies infer criminality 
on the behaviours, traits or characteristics 
of a group, behaviours that in isolation are 
non-criminal. Processes of criminalisation 
enable policy makers and law enforcement 
agencies to define what behaviours are 
criminal and should be policed. However, 
rather than focusing upon what governments 
may decide are problematic behaviours, 
campaigners should be alert to and where 
necessary, challenge the definitions of crime 
being handed down by the state. Our question 
should be, ‘what factors (political, economic, 
law enforcement policy, etc.) result in defining 
specific behaviours as criminal?’ In asking 
such questions, we can reveal the particular 
groups being targeted by contemporary law 
enforcement policies and practices.
Racialisation refers to the process of 
attributing negative characteristics to groups 
based upon their belonging to a specific 
ethnic group. Racialisation recognises power 
relations as a historical socio-political feature 
of any given society and therefore helps us to 
understand why different groups at different 
times are portrayed as problematic in different 
European countries. 
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CAse study 1: gAngs As strAtegIC subjeCts
Despite the absence of a clear European wide definition, social researchers have noted the emergence of 
government policy in response to collectives of mainly young people in specific countries. In the Netherlands 
it is estimated that there are 1,154 gangs members while in Spain, there are reportedly three types of gangs, 
namely the ‘extreme right’, ‘extreme left’ and ‘Latin bands’. In France, there were reportedly 222 gangs in 
2009, comprised of some 2,500 individuals which had increased to 313 gangs by 2011. Within England and 
Wales, there are upwards of 3,800 gang nominals whose details are recorded on a bespoke gangs database 
which is managed by the London Metropolitan Police.   
RESPONSES TO THE ‘gANg’?18
 » In Spain, the government established the police coordination and intervention plan against ‘organised 
violent juvenile groups’ which included ‘increasing intelligence on gangs through mapping and monitoring; 
cross-agency training on gang issues; increasing contact with teachers, parents and young people; setting 
up of government advisory groups and improving collaboration within criminal justice settings including 
prisons’.19
 » In France, a ‘gang shut down strategy’ to be driven by amongst other approaches, called for ‘increasing the 
intelligence within areas exposed to the [gang] problems by making use of real time intervention’.  
 » In Portugal, law enforcement professionals reported a significant issue with juvenile gangs. Positive 
approaches to the ‘problem’ were reported as ‘working with youngsters and their families in the 
community, for example in socially deprived areas where youngsters are at higher risk of becoming 
involved in violent offending and participating in gangs’. Here, intervention programmes were concentrated 
(again) in ‘at risk’ communities.  
 » Denmark and Sweden have dedicated multi-agency ‘gang’ management units which have been significant 
in driving up the numbers of minority groups who are made subject to gang interventions.  
Whilst the above does not infer the minority status of those who are deemed to be involved with gangs, 
research highlights the racialising tendencies in the European attention to the phenomenon of gangs.20  
What emerges is a reluctance across European jurisdictions to discuss the ethnicity of ‘gang’ members or 
those who were thought to perpetrate youth violence.  Despite this, the study found that young people 
from immigrant backgrounds were significantly over-represented in the youth justice system of France, the 
Netherlands and Sweden. In Sweden, practitioners were more inclined to discuss the growing inequality 
between rich and poor and the similarly growing (economic) inequalities between young people of Swedish 
and non-Swedish background. In the Netherlands, gang suppression strategies have focused attention upon 
Moroccan descent communities, with some acknowledgement of how strategies need to be ‘culturally-
sensitive’ for racialised minority and religious groups in gang figures. In London, approximately 78% of those 
recorded to the police gang database are from a black minority ethnic background.  
Despite some ambiguity in acknowledging the racialisation of police-defined gangs across Europe, a study 
undertaken in 2006 indicated the following:
‘Students of American gangs are used to hearing of Hispanic and black gangs, while less commonly of Asian or 
white. In Europe, the street gangs are also primarily composed of ethnic or national minorities, reflecting the 
immigration and refugee patterns of those countries. Indigenous street gangs are reported in Holland, Norway, 
Denmark, Germany, Russia and Italy, but the more common gangs are composed of Algerians, Moroccans, 
Turks, Indians, Pakistanis, Jamaicans, Chinese and Albanians, among others.’21
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CAse study 2: CrImInAlIsIng CommunItIes
The hardwiring of racialised criminalisation has resulted in members of ethnic, national or religious minority 
groups all being viewed and surveyed with a presumption of criminality. As such, individuals who are 
members of such communities, irrespective of whether they are engaged in criminal behaviour or not, can 
be made subject to police and law enforcement attention simply due to their membership of the suspect 
community.  
Alarmingly, in Denmark, the emergence of the highly contentious practice of criminalising communities 
can be found in the establishment of ‘ghetto lists’, ghetto zones or ‘harsh penalty zones’ in 2018 wherein 
individuals who are found guilty of an offence will be subjected to ‘double punishment’ compared to 
individuals who do not live within geographically defined ghetto zones. By way of clarity, an area is ascribed 
harsh penalty zone status where it matches at least three out of five of the following ‘social criteria’:
 » The population is more than 50% non-Western immigrant.
 » More than 2.7 % of inhabitants have criminal convictions.
 » Unemployment is above 40%. 
 » More than 50% have only a basic education.
 » Inhabitants’ average gross income is less than 55% of the average of the region.22,23,24
Of significance here, the dominant criteria for inclusion within a ‘zone’ is not related to the rates of crime 
within the geographical area, but appear driven by a political reaction to the concentration of ‘non-Western 
immigrants’. The move towards criminalising communities marks the deliberate effort to regulate the 
estimated 28,000 immigrants who are thought to be concentrated in ‘ghettos’ who are constructed as 
resistance to integration to Danish society’s norms and values. The specific groups for attention are noted as 
those of predominantly ‘Somali or Lebanese background’. As part of the implementation phase, the policy 
makes direct reference to the introduction of ‘monitoring and surveillance’ within ghetto zones, seemingly to 
facilitate the speedy prosecution and conviction of ‘offenders’. 
‘The effect of these [harsh penalty zone] laws will be clearly racist, and discriminatory on grounds of religion. It 
is one thing to promise increased policing of high-crime areas. But to make such crimes as vandalism, burglary, 
threatening behaviour, arson and offences against the drug laws punishable by twice the sentences when 
committed within the designated ghettos is just grotesque.’ 25
Central here is a presumption of criminality and the attribution of stigma to communities racially defined 
as ‘ghettos’ and through which negatively racialised groups reside. Of further concern is the isolation 
of the variable and particularly the ‘50% non-western immigrant’ measure which once calculated will 
‘hardwire’ discrimination and ethnic profiling into policing practice and drive the police to police minority 
communities differently. The consequence of this is that, where law enforcement investigations are 
enacted, then the technology serves to assist risk-making and will support the speedy prosecution and 
conviction of minority immigrant individuals within such communities. The technological drivers for 
policing in this regard are numerous but explicitly serve to drive the policing or minority groups and to 
increase the notoriously low conviction rates that exist across European countries.
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polICIng teChnologIes
The use of technology to support and 
advance policing is not new. Whether 
the technology is employed to assist law 
enforcement agencies with managing the 
information they already hold, or to collect 
new information, as the pace of technological 
development has increased so has police 
appetite to make use of technology. As a 
result, there is a wide spectrum of ways 
in which law enforcement agencies use 
technology. Within the following, we 
summarise technology that, despite potential 
racialising effects, is acknowledged as 
assisting the policing function. Obvious 
tensions in the development of assistive 
technologies will become apparent; law 
enforcement increasingly use them against or 
in communities presumed to be ‘criminal’, but 
also, as we will develop later, they serve law 
enforcement agencies in the exploitation of 
data gathering mechanisms to enhance pre-
existing data sources. 
the surveillance industry
The companies building surveillance tools for law 
enforcement arguably have more in common with 
defence contractors than the technology sector. A 
report by NGO Privacy International26 shows the 
global surveillance industry is overwhelmingly based 
in economically advanced, large arms exporting 
states, with the US, UK, France, Germany and 
Israel comprising the top five countries in which 
the companies are headquartered. A number of 
companies were founded by former intelligence or law 
enforcement agents and many employ high numbers 
of former government personnel.27
Due to the specialised nature of the tools they 
develop and sell, the majority of companies providing 
technologies to law enforcement will not be household 
names.28 There are some exceptions to this, such 
as where companies are developing multi-purpose 
technologies that could be deployed in a number of 
different sectors. One example is NEC whose facial 
recognition technology29 is used commercially as well 
as by the public safety sector, or the provision of cloud 
services such as Amazon Web Services which are used 
widely by companies, but is also the platform of choice 
for the deployment of the UK’s new nationwide police 
intelligence database.30 Some companies, such as Axon, 
have made decisions not to sell face-matching products 
as part of their body-worn cameras31 due to ethical 
concerns, while others like data analytics company 
Palantir have refused to cancel lucrative contracts with 
U.S. Customs and Immigration Enforcement despite the 
ramping up of punitive immigration policies.32
technology is not neutral?
It is often argued - including by technology developers 
themselves - that technology is neutral or amoral. 
However, this proposition ignores the intentions 
of those who design and produce technology. 
Technology does not simply come into existence, 
immaculately conceived and purposeless. Instead 
it is a product of its time, with all the political and 
social influences this brings. Often companies design 
technology with specific purposes in mind, such as 
solving a specific ‘crime’ challenge, possibly for a 
police client, and inevitably incorporating many of the 
client’s ideas and assumptions. Rather than seeing 
technology as neutral or amoral, it is more accurate 
to see it in its wider context: that its development was 
likely by a company, possibly founded by a former 
intelligence or law enforcement professional, to sell to 
other intelligence law enforcement bodies, primarily 
to make a profit. With that in mind, rather than seeing 
the creation and adoption of a new kind of technology 
in the area of policing as neutral act, we should 
view it in the same way as any other new policy or 
development in policing. 
Due to the high level of involvement of former law 
enforcement professionals in designing technology 
for law enforcement, it is probable that assumptions 
of suspicion, risk and (racialised) criminalisation 
influence the design and the broader organisational 
understandings of crime. To illustrate, drawing upon 
a noteworthy study,33 law enforcement perceptions of 
criminality, including what geographical areas were 
perceived as criminal was informed by a ‘corporate 
memory’ which is culturally specific to the local law 
enforcement agency. The corporate memory means 
that, rather than being objective or neutral, policing 
practice is organisationally informed by past experiences 
and attitudes as well as what is or is not remembered. 
The same study found that police officers believed that 
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‘high intensity’ areas for serious violence were those that 
were characterised by high ethnic heterogeneity. This 
view persisted even in light of contradictory evidence 
presented to the police based on police recorded crime. 
In other words, the police officers’ perception of ‘unsafe 
areas’ was premised upon the ‘concentration of minority 
ethnic people’, suggesting that the presumption of 
criminality is driven more by ‘what is remembered’ and 
concealed within the corporate memory of the police 
and law enforcement agents.   
The development of technological fixes to ‘crime 
problems’, particularly when the technology is 
premised upon racialised police assumptions, may 
simply perpetuate pre-existing human biases and 
social inequalities. The belief in the independence and 
objectivity of data-driven policing solutions and in 
particular, predictive policing programmes will send 
law enforcement officers to monitor and detect crimes 
in the same already over-policed communities.34 
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AUTOMATIC NUMbER PLATE RECOgNITION
Police are also increasingly using automatic number plate recognition (ANPR). ANPR 
cameras are physically installed to record passing cars, and use optical character 
recognition to convert number plates to digital text, which can then be cross-checked 
against national police and driver databases. While these technologies have not 
changed much since they were introduced more than fifteen years ago45 there are 
new proposals to link these systems with other existing video surveillance systems, 
and join together the analytic capabilities, including those from automated facial 
recognition systems.46 ANPR cameras record cars passing through a checkpoint, or if enough ANPR cameras 
are deployed, act as a real-time record of cars moving through the road network and their location. While ANPR 
cameras are in common use across Western Europe,47 there has been limited discussion about the potentially 
discriminatory ways these cameras can be used. There are concerns that cars can be ‘marked’, leading to increased 
stop and search, made possible due to ANPR-triggered traffic stops.48 The Brandenburg police used the example 
of looking for “motorhomes or caravans with Polish license plates” in a recent leaked internal evaluation of the 
system.49 The ability to search for license plates of a particular nationality, and indeed looking for ‘motorhomes or 
caravans’ is highly suggestive of a potentially discriminatory focus on Travellers or Roma.50,51
who is this? Identification technologies
Identifying individuals has always been a key part of police work. Modern police services now have a 
number of different tools and technologies at their disposal to answer the question ‘who is this person?’ 
This includes facial recognition, automatic number plate recognition, voice print identification and the 
increasing use of mobile finger-print identification. This section will briefly introduce some of the key 
technologies deployed by law enforcement against ethnic minority communities.
FACIAL RECOgNITION
The public and private sector continue to use video surveillance systems (or CCTV) 
to monitor spaces. These systems are fundamentally the same as they were when 
they were introduced.35 What has changed is the advent of new analytic capabilities, 
seeking to make use of the captured video imagery. The ability to do this, affordably 
and at scale, fundamentally increases the intrusiveness of these tools. Video 
analytics can automate the identification of people in day-to-day life. Capabilities 
to identify people by their ‘gait’ (how they walk and move), are being referenced in 
governmental strategy documents36 but the most publicised of recent new capabilities is the increased use of 
automated facial recognition technology. 
Automated facial recognition technology can detect faces in an image or video and compare it to other databases 
to attempt to identify individuals. Police who are deploying high-resolution cameras in public spaces use it to 
identify individuals on a watch list or suspect list in real time. Studies show that automated facial recognition 
technology disproportionality misidentifies women and people from black and minority ethnic groups.37 This 
means that police are more likely to wrongfully stop, question and possibly arrest them. There have been trials 
of the use of automated facial recognition technology in public spaces in the UK where individuals who tried 
to hide their faces from the camera were stopped for ‘suspicious behaviour’38 and issued with a public order 
fine. Early deployments of facial recognition in the UK include events that serve minority ethnic communities 
and most notably the Notting Hill carnival for the identification of ‘persons of interest’. In Germany, police have 
retrospectively searched video footage from the G20 summit protests39 to try to identify protesters before the 
State Data Protection Commissioner of Hamburg stopped the practice.40 There have been some evaluations of 
automated facial recognition tools by police41,42 and the practice is currently subject to legal challenge in the UK.43  
Public authorities in San Francisco, the City of Oakland, and Somerville, Massachusetts have all voted to ban the 
use of facial recognition technology by city agencies including police departments.44
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SPEAKER IDENTIFICATION
Police are also increasingly exploring using other forms of biometrics such 
as speaker identification. It should be noted the difference between speaker 
identification which identifies who is speaking, and speech identification which 
identifies what is being said. Speaker identification works by taking samples of 
a known voice, and then converting key features of the voice into an algorithmic 
template known as a voice print or voice model. There is little knowledge about 
individual police services’ practices with speaker identification at the national level, 
however police forces in the UK, Portugal and Italy have been involved in pilots.52 Intelligence agencies have 
used voice biometrics for at least a decade at significant scale,53 and at the international policing level there 
are some high profile efforts such as Interpol’s recently completed Speaker Identification Integrated Project.54 
The Interpol project will provide a shared voice biometric database for 192 police forces. The tool goes beyond 
identifying a speaker; it filters voice samples by gender, age, language, and accent. Police forces using the 
technology can upload intercepted phone calls, recorded audio, or search against voices on social media. Such 
biometrics can be captured in a number of ways, including for example via YouTube. This makes them much 
easier to acquire than other forms of biometrics, such as DNA for example. For individuals sharing videos of 
themselves, most would not realise that their voices (and potentially faces) are being turned into biometric 
prints that might later be used by police to identify them. Studies looking at speech recognition tools found 
significant gender and racial biases.55,56  
MObILE FINgERPRINT TECHNOLOgy
Finally, mobile fingerprint technology are transforming another long used 
police capability; to identify individuals using fingerprints. With an app on a law 
enforcement agent’s phone and a handheld scanner, police are able to check 
fingerprints against existing police and government databases (including immigration 
records) in real time. In Germany the technology has been in use for over a decade,57 
and in the United Kingdom trials are taking place in London58 and Yorkshire.59 
Agencies do not provide figures of the ethnic breakdown of those whose fingerprint 
is being checked or taken using these systems, but given the racial disparity of those stopped and searched, 
and the disparity of previous biometric databases like DNA databases,60 it is likely that the use of this tool will 
disproportionately affect minority ethnic communities.  
18 Data-driven policing: the hardwiring of discriminatory policing practices across Europe
who knows who? data harvesting and network mapping
Police are using a range of technologies to try to build a picture of social interactions and 
relationships. These are all designed to build intelligence and to help answer the question ‘who 
knows who?’ In pursuing suspects or individuals who the police and law enforcement officials 
may think of as suspicious, such technologies can be used to try to tie groups of individuals to 
each other.  In the context of collective forms of punishment, the use of these techniques to build 
or confirm associations between individuals and groups is an attempt to demonstrate criminal 
networks and relationships for the purpose of prosecution. There are a number of tools police 
may use to do this, including social media monitoring, the use of call detail records, mobile phone 
extraction, IMSI catchers and body worn cameras.
SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORINg
Police forces are increasingly conducting social media monitoring to gather 
information about what is happening on social networking platforms like Facebook 
or Twitter. It includes online public interactions, but also those happening in private 
groups. This can be as simple as a police officer browsing the ‘public facing’ parts 
of social media websites, to creating a fake persona to infiltrate private groups, to 
scraping or acquiring social media information in bulk to try to mine the data for 
connections.61 In the UK, social media is used to keep track of ‘gang associated 
individuals’, and if a person shares content 
on social media that refers to a gang name, 
or to certain colours, flags or attire linked 
to a gang, they may be added to a gang 
database according to research by Amnesty 
International.62 Similarly, police regularly 
monitor videos on social media to identify 
links and associations between different 
individuals. Given the racialisation of 
gangs, discussed above, it is likely that such 
technology will be deployed against minority 
ethnic people and groups.    
Sales brochure for social media monitoring tools. 
Available at: https://sii.transparencytoolkit.org/
docs/Semptian-Technologies_POMS_Brochure_1sii_
documents.
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CALL DETAIL RECORDS
Police can also use ‘call detail records’ (CDRs) of mobile phones to build a picture of 
who knows who. These records originated as billing records generated by mobile 
phone providers when service was provided on a per minute or per text basis, and 
now are required to be retained throughout Europe under data retention laws. 
They record the ‘to, from, where and when’.63 These CDRs are held by mobile phone 
companies and can be requested by police services, usually only after independent 
authorisation. Requesting the call detail history of an individual immediately provides 
the police with an extensive view of someone’s network or social graph by analysing 
call, text, and location history. 
IMSI CATCHERS
Other tools, like IMSI catchers, can also be used to identify everyone who attended 
a particular place at a particular time. An IMSI catcher64 is a surveillance tool that 
works by pretending to be a legitimate mobile phone tower, which can then be 
used by police forces to achieve a number of different goals. IMSI catchers work in 
different ways, which means that there is a variation in how different police services 
use them, however, there are a number of common features including identification, 
interception,65 blocking66 and locating.67
An IMSI catcher can force your mobile phone to relay an IMSI number, which is unique and tied to your sim card, 
and its IMEI number,68 which is tied to a physical handset or mobile device. Once acquired, police services can 
link this to your identity by either contacting your mobile phone provider or comparing it against other databases 
already acquired. This is further assisted if the country has SIM card registration requirements in place, as many 
countries across Europe do.69
IMSI catchers are mostly used as tactical tools, having to be physically on site, and have a limited range. 
Historically they have been very bulky and were often deployed in vans, but modern IMSI catchers can be no larger 
than the size of a small backpack, and body-worn versions that are worn under clothing also exist.70
Other tools can be used in the place of IMSI catchers if the goal is simply to block calls such as mobile phone 
jammers,71 or the police could require the telephone company to shut down the network in a particular 
geography.72 Different police forces have different policies in relation to the secrecy of IMSI catchers. In the United 
Kingdom, police still neither confirm nor deny their use, whereas in Germany, the technology is avowed and 
deployments are reported annually to the Bundestag.73 Because of their secrecy, there are no independent studies 
of how police are using IMSI catchers. 
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MObILE PHONE ExTRACTION
With physical access to your mobile phone, police are able to extract all the 
information held on the device, including deleted data, data stored in the cloud, 
and data you didn’t realise was being collected by your phone. There are a number 
of ways that law enforcement tools seek to achieve this. If the phone is unlocked, 
they are able to extract the information directly. If the phone is locked, with strong 
device encryption, then there are tools that allow the police to hack your phone to 
gain access to the internal data. There are concerns about the police seizing mobile 
phones in the context of a stop and search and the legality of extracting data mobile phones.74
Depending on the brand and model of the seized phone, how recently the phones’ software was updated, and 
which extraction tool the police are using, the police will gain access with varying success. The information that 
can be extracted from a mobile phone75 includes all phone contacts, messages, photos, web browsing history, 
location history, as well as potentially data used in apps and services such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter and 
others. Whilst there are no independent studies on the use of these tools, there have been reports by civil society 
organisations like Privacy International into their use by police.76
One area for further consideration is that protections for individuals are often weakest at the border, where police 
have more lenient search powers and are increasingly using mobile phone extraction technologies as part of their 
work policing borders. Even if, once searched, nothing is found, the data can be held, and it can be bulk uploaded 
into a central database to be accessed in the future. In the United Kingdom, the intelligence agencies received a 
copy of every phone downloaded at the border over the previous month.77 Given the racial disparity (discussed 
earlier) in who is stopped at the border it is of particular significance. There are no statistics in the UK for how 
many times police undertake data extraction, nor is there oversight of racial disparity in their use.
The use of mobile phone extraction is a formidable threat to privacy, and indeed is the single easiest way for police 
to gather huge quantities of information about an individual’s private life, who they know, where they have been, 
and indeed, potentially where they will be in future.78
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bODy WORN CAMERAS
Body worn cameras are wearable video cameras, usually visible and mounted 
on the chest or the shoulder of a police officer. Different cameras have different 
feature sets with some models recording audio and others only capturing 
images over a time-lapse period. Many are fitted with pre-record functionality 
so there is a continuous buffer of the last few minutes of video being recorded 
which can be stored if the officer presses a button after the event. Others start 
recording automatically after certain triggers. Police forces across Europe have 
carried out trials for over a decade now with goals of improving the quality of evidence around incidents, as 
well as deterring crime. Meta studies suggest that the use of body worn cameras has little impact on officer 
behaviour as originally expected.79 Body worn cameras are in use in the UK80 and the Netherlands,81 among 
other European countries. Due to their overt nature, and lack of sensitivity surrounding the technology, there 
have been a number of studies on the impact and effect body-worn cameras have on both police and citizen 
behaviour.82,83,84 The adoption of the tool has split civil liberties organisations, with the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) in the United States advocating for use of the tools with accompanying privacy safeguards, 
and the parallel organisation in the United Kingdom, Liberty, raising concerns about the deployment of the 
technology, withholding support on the basis of the available evidence. 
Concerns have also been raised as to the point at which recordings are initiated by the police. The central 
focus of police worn cameras as an assistive tool means that the focus of attention is subjectively driven by 
law enforcement officers rather than an evidential base for ensuring fair and accountable policing. More 
controversially, the numerous accounts of police brutality captured (or not) on body worn cameras have not 
facilitated the pursuit of justice. At the time of writing, the inquest into the killing of Rashan Charles by the 
police during arrest, heard evidence that the police officer did not turn on his body worn camera, which is the 
procedure in his pursuit of a suspect.85
As an image and audio capture platform, police can use these tools to review footage, better identify individuals 
and build out networks between them and others in frame. The ability for police to run identification and 
network analytics in addition, including facial and voice recognition, is the inevitable next step for police using 
this tool.
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jermAIne lewIs And the englIsh rIots
Jermaine Lewis was one of a group of young black men convicted of riot, possession of a firearm with intent to 
endanger life, and arson being reckless as to whether life was endangered, for an incident in Birmingham which 
occurred during the August 2011 disturbances in cities across the UK. 
A group of 42 mostly black men congregated outside The Barton Arms pub in the Aston area of Birmingham. Some 
of the men began throwing furniture from the pub into the road and set the ground floor alight with petrol bombs. 
Four different firearms discharged at least 12 rounds in the direction of police arriving at the scene and at the police 
helicopter capturing events on CCTV from above. 
Lewis could not be identified on any of the CCTV footage as being at the scene. One of his co-defendants, whom he 
had met on holiday and who had travelled up to Birmingham, could be identified, but was not seen to engage in 
any acts of violence. Lewis maintains that he drove his friend and his cousin to the scene and then drove off. The 
prosecution used cell-site evidence to allege that phones linked to Lewis, his friend and his cousin were in the same 
general area at around the same times that evening. They then inferred that a break in regular telephone contact 
between the three phones during this period meant the men were together throughout the evening. 
The prosecution brought the defendants’ previous convictions and various media reports supposedly 
demonstrating gang affiliation to the trial. This so-called ‘bad character evidence’ was intended to show that the 
defendants had a propensity toward violence involving guns, knew guns were being carried by some members of 
the group and would be used with intent to kill if necessary, and had negative attitudes towards the police. This 
enabled members of the group who did not commit acts of violence to be convicted of the offences. 
Evidence of gang affiliation mainly revolved around rap videos posted online and pictures downloaded to the 
defendants’ phones, which were interpreted by expert witnesses who were in fact police officers. It was not alleged 
that any of the defendants were actually gang members. One of the defendants appeared in rap videos associated 
to a police-defined gang made up of mainly Asian young men and which had not been identified as being a group 
involved in any specific law-breaking. 
Evidence was adduced linking some of the defendants with a gang named the ‘Raiders’. A music video featuring 
alleged members of the Raiders appearing alongside alleged members of the ‘Johnson Crew’ was presented as 
evidence of an association between the two gangs. 
Members of these affiliated groups were said by the police officers to have a hallmark hand gesture known 
as ‘throwing the sixes’. This hand signal is given in some of the rap videos by some of the defendants. Lyrics 
referencing ‘gang behaviour’ were cited by the prosecution. Tattoos with the initials of some of the gang names 
were used as evidence against some of the defendants. 
Lewis appeared in a video called ‘Gangbusters R Us’ together with his cousin who police identified as one of the 
gunmen in the trial. The judgement from Lewis’ failed appeal states, ‘although his role was less prominent, Lewis 
did spend much of the video in close proximity to [his cousin]’. One lyric refers to a ‘0.44’ and ‘Phantom’ (Lewis’ 
nickname, or as the prosecution referred to it, his ‘street-name’). When this lyric comes up in the video, Lewis 
mimics a shooting action. On Lewis’ phone, a downloaded picture of the emblem of the ‘Raiders’ along with the 
word ‘menace’ was found. Downloaded pictures of guns were also on his phone, as well as one of a hooded man 
pointing a handgun. 
In Lewis’ appeal it states, ‘[he] had no significant criminal history but…he was an active member of the ‘Raiders’ 
gang which had used firearms in the past. The video material and that from his phone demonstrated his attitudes 
to guns and the police. It was pointed out, on his behalf, that he did not have any gun or use any gun.’
Lewis received a sentence of 23 years in prison.
Source: Centre for Crime and Justice Studies (2016)
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what do we know? database 
fusion, enrichment and analysis
Police forces hold large quantities of 
information, but are rarely in a position to fully 
exploit the data they hold. Instead, police data 
is often managed across multiple separate 
systems that are not mutually compatible. A 
recent report by UK think tank RUSI highlights 
that in the UK “the analysis of digital data 
is almost entirely manual, despite software 
being available to automate much of this 
process”.86 There are few police forces in the 
UK with tools to analyse unstructured data 
such as images and video, and consequently 
there are fundamental limitations as to how 
the police can use data. 
With that said, efforts to remedy these issues are 
increasing, with only institutional inertia and lack 
of funding delaying the adoption of new tools. In 
preparation, more and more police forces are seeking 
to reorganise their IT architecture to better exploit the 
information they hold. 
In Germany, a project entitled Police 2020 aims to 
overhaul existing infrastructure and merge all the 
major databases of federal and state police forces 
into a single warehouse. Currently led by the state 
of Hesse, a pilot project provides access to multiple 
databases via a single search interface.87
In the United Kingdom, the National Law Enforcement 
Data programme is seeking to merge two of the 
largest databases, the Police National Computer 
(PNC) and Police National Database (PND). This will 
include 55.4 million driver records, 54.8 million vehicle 
records, intelligence files, 12 million images, as well as 
approximately 10.7 million criminal records.88
Other systems in other countries are also increasingly 
being merged or reconfigured, to provide better 
access to intelligence that police already hold, but 
also in preparation for more complex data analysis to 
be run across the joined databases, or indeed lay the 
groundwork for future predictive policing systems.89 
Europe-wide databases are slowly growing in scope 
such as SIS, the EU’s border information management 
system which includes information on criminal activity, 
immigration violations and missing persons. New 
datasets are being integrated, as well as new search 
functionalities, such as the inclusion of the European 
wide Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) 
and the upgrade to allow searches via fingerprints.90
The issues raised by the ability to search for complex 
information, that might permit analysis against 
protected characteristics like ethnic profiling, or 
indirectly via characteristics used as a proxy for 
ethnicity is poorly studied and there is little to no 
guidance currently in use by police forces. In 2006, 
the Constitutional Court of Germany considered the 
lawfulness of data-mining techniques to try to identify 
‘sleeper’ cells post 9/11 which included discriminating 
based on protected characteristics. In that case, 
the court found the practice illegal, but only in the 
absence of a “concrete danger” to security or lives.91 
It is likely that further research, legal analysis and 
guidance is necessary to ensure that police forces are 
not using ethnic profiling in the course of their increasing 
data fusion, enrichment and analysis practices. 
what will happen? predictive 
policing tools
Police use predictive policing programmes 
to understand and estimate where and when 
future crimes are likely to be committed - 
or who is likely to commit them. These are 
commonly referred to as place-based or 
person-based prediction tools.  
The majority of tools under the banner of predictive 
policing make general, rather than specific forecasts, 
and as such may be more usefully labelled as 
‘forecasting’ tools. This is true even of systems with 
purported capacity to make predictions of crime 
within the timeframe of a single day.92
Looking for trends in crime data has always been 
part of police work. For some tools, this is merely the 
continuation of that practice, whilst others go further 
and attempt to make decisions about what the crime 
data means, and then forecast where and when crime 
might happen or who might commit them. 
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This has a number of knock-on effects, but an 
important consequence can be that the police place an 
over reliance on ‘answers’ provided by that technology, 
decreasing the weight of independent scrutiny as a 
challenge to the technology. Indeed, senior police 
officers have highlighted that police officers “may lack 
the confidence and knowledge to question or override 
an algorithmic recommendation”. 93
There is no central record on the number of police 
forces using predictive policing tools in any country 
in Europe, and consequently there is little available 
information about the types of crimes these tools are 
being applied to, the companies behind the tools, or 
continuous assessment of whether they are effective. 
Police data works to legitimise the datasets and the 
police practices that produced them, rendering them 
seemingly infallible.94 This is because predictive 
policing ‘rearticulates’ police data as ‘scientifically 
valid’ and provides law enforcement officials with a 
‘new vocabulary’ to explain the over-policing and the 
concomitant harms of racialised policing. Whilst for 
many, police data is assumed neutral, it is evident that 
the ‘entire computational structure’ is based upon 
subjective biases of law enforcement officers. Research 
studies show that data-driven technologies that inform 
predictive policing resulted in an increase in levels of 
arrest for racialised communities by 30%.95 Predictive 
technological capabilities also supply law enforcement 
agencies with a rationale for expanding policing which 
exacerbates racialised policing.  
PERSON-bASED PREDICTIvE TOOLS
Across Europe, media and institutions have consistently 
constructed the ‘gang’ as a notion based on the racialised 
criminalisation of minority groups and communities. The 
gang has been used as a ‘useful suspect’ to rationalise 
the development of data-driven technologies in order to 
respond to the threat of ‘gangs’, organised crime groups 
or youth groups depending upon the jurisdiction. 
Arguably, whilst responses to the ‘gang’ in Europe infer 
the need for  technology either through the monitoring 
and/or surveillance of ‘at risk’ communities, it is the 
racialised dimensions of gang constructions and in 
turn disparities in the policing of gangs and minority 
communities that raise particular concern. 
Some predictive policing tools use complex machine 
learning,96 which makes it difficult to understand the 
process or model that produced the result, but others 
use simple algorithms, which can be understood 
without needing a background in computer science. 
For example, the Offender Group Reconviction 
Score (OGRS) is a predictor of re-offending based on 
static risk such as age, gender and criminal history 
to calculate individual predictions.  The tool is 
employed by probation and prison services across 
Europe and is built upon an algorithm to calculate 
the likelihood of reoffending (which is expressed as 
a percentage score).  There are key variables that 
feed directly into the calculation of OGRS, which 
have the potential to have a discriminatory effect on 
minority ethnic groups namely, age at first sanction 
(including warnings, (never) cautions, etc) and age at 
first conviction. Given the effects of suspicion which 
result in increased levels of police stops, it is logical 
that the calculation of their risk of reconviction will be 
higher, not as a consequence of criminal activity, but 
as a consequence of the increased likelihood of being 
stopped by the police and law enforcement agencies.  
Consequently, measures of risk within justice contexts 
are used to determine the level of punishment and 
intervention dosage that a convicted individual should 
receive. Typically, the greater the risk (of harm or 
reoffending) posed, the more intensive and punitive the 
punishment given. Evidently, higher levels of risk and 
in turn punishments are more probable for individuals 
who reside within over-policed communities and 
consequently, this will disproportionately affect 
racialised minority communities.
Predictive policing systems necessarily rely 
heavily on historical data held by police, which 
can contain biases. ‘biased data’ does not mean 
data that was gathered with bad intentions, or 
data that will be unfair if used in a certain way. 
When a system is trained on data that contains 
bias, any subsequent police method or strategy 
based upon such data are inclined to reproduce 
those biases in its results. For example, historical 
data held by police about crimes is not a record of 
the levels of crime within any given geographical 
space, but instead is a record of the crimes that 
are reported to the police or perhaps a record 
of events when law enforcement officers have 
responded to situations in a community. Further, 
biases can have a ‘ratchet effect’ meaning that 
the distortion will get incrementally worse each 
year if police services rely on the evidence of last 
year’s data in order to set next year’s targets.
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PLACE-bASED PREDICTIvE TOOLS
Place-based predictive systems are designed to assist 
police in determining the timing and location of 
police interventions. The United Kingdom has been 
experimenting with using ‘hotspot analysis’ called 
ProMap since 200498 and in the Netherlands, a place 
based predictive tool called the Crime Anticipation 
System has been used in Amsterdam since 2014. 
Usually, place-based predictive tools use historical 
data held by police departments as the starting point, 
but some supplement with other data depending on 
the focus of the system. Programmes have sought 
to include the weather, socio-economic data of the 
geographic area, and even the location of off-licences99 
in their calculations. Some systems are acquiring 
information from data brokers, such as from Experian 
who have one billion people and businesses in their 
dataset,100 and who have been accused of acting 
illegally in amassing these datasets.101
A significant concern for ethnic minority communities 
is that place-based predictive tools will take data from 
police records already based on practices of over-
policing certain communities, and forecast that based 
on the higher rates of police intervention in those areas, 
police should prioritise policing those areas further. 
CAse study 3: gAngs mAtrIx
The Gangs Matrix is a risk-management tool focused on preventing serious violence run by the Metropolitan 
Police. It is a database of suspected gang members in London that began as a response to the London riots in 
2011 and by 2017 over 3,806 people had been included within the Matrix. There are a number of problems with 
the system:
 » A disproportionate number of individuals on the Matrix are black, indeed, 78% of those on the Gangs Matrix 
are black, compared to only 27% of those responsible for serious youth violence are black. 
 » There is no clear guidance or criteria for including individuals onto the Matrix, and researchers at Amnesty 
documented inconsistent approaches being used by different bodies, with varying threshold levels. 
 » 40% of people listed on the matrix have no record of involvement in any violent offence in the past two 
years and 35% have never committed any ‘serious offence’ despite it being a risk management tool focused 
on preventing serious violence.
The Matrix isn’t an exclusively police tool; ‘partner agencies’ include housing associations, job centres and 
borough youth services but there are no legal safeguards around the sharing of data.97 Individuals are given an 
automated green, amber, or red violence ranking, and because of the data-sharing this stigmatising ‘red flag’ 
can follow people in their interaction with other government agencies causing further problems.
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CAse study 4: CrIme AntICIpAtIon system
In Amsterdam, the Crime Anticipation System is a place-based predictive policing tool which attempts to 
predict where specific crimes, such as burglary, muggings and assaults will take place within a two-week 
period. Amsterdam Police developed the system to predict more at-risk areas in a city, and improve efficient 
distribution of their workforce. The system uses machine learning to analyse three sources of data:
 » socio-economic data from the Central Bureau of Statistics which includes people’s age, incomes and the 
amount of social benefits in an area
 »  historical crime data, originally gathered by the police, focusing on previous crimes, locations and known 
criminals
 » Geo-data from the Municipal Administration which consists of streets and addresses. This is not used in the 
model to predict, but rather provides the basis of the map on top of which the predictions sit.
The aim of the analysis is to grade different areas of Amsterdam into red, orange and yellow. Areas that are 
graded red are considered high-risk and have increased police surveillance deployed to prevent predicted 
crimes from occurring.102,103
An image from the Crime Anticipation System. Source: Willems, D (2014) Presentation: ‘CAS: Crime Anticipation System’. Available at:  
https://event.cwi.nl/mtw2014/media/files/Willems,%20Dick%20-%20CAS%20Crime%20anticipation%20system%20_%20predicting%20
policing%20in%20Amsterdam.pdf.
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ChAllenges And opportunItIes
Due to excessive secrecy surrounding what the police 
regard as sensitive capabilities, it can be very difficult to 
understand the specifics of how many of the tools listed 
above work or how they are used day-to-day. While there 
is public information about all the tools mentioned in 
this report, different police forces do not officially confirm 
the use of some of them. This can make conversations 
about the legal basis of usage far more complex than it 
should be. While there are still many police services who 
think secrecy is necessary to ensure they can do their 
work, there are also many who work on the assumption 
that they have to keep such information confidential, 
without continually assessing whether that is strictly 
necessary. Sometimes, the reason for the secrecy stems 
not from the police, but because the vendors of the tools 
claim that the algorithms or technology powering the 
tools is proprietary. This has shielded the tools from 
scrutiny from the public, the courts, but also in some 
circumstances the police bodies purchasing the tools.104 
The appropriate response is to seek to force transparency 
by filing Freedom of Information requests, requiring 
police services to reconsider their position, release the 
information or document their position of secrecy.  
Alongside Freedom of Information requests, there 
have been recent efforts by individuals to use data-
rights to find out what information police are holding 
about them and compel the police to delete this 
information.105 The claimant in Catt v UK used a ‘subject 
access request’ to discover that the police placed him 
on an ‘Extremism Database’, and then successfully 
argued the police should delete this data.
While some of the technology discussed in this report 
may seem complex, the police are not a technical body 
(outside of specialist technical teams), and the majority 
of officers working with the technology will not be 
technically sophisticated. In part, this is due to the fact 
that “[t]echnological training is virtually non-existent for 
police officers” according to the Royal United Services 
Institute106 and echoed in Police Federation reports.107 
Therefore, while police secrecy causes an information 
asymmetry it does not mean that the police are more 
technically capable than anti-discrimination activists 
might be. 
It should also not be assumed that all police officers 
welcome the deployment of these tools. Indeed, some 
police officers see the introduction of new technology 
as ‘gimmicks’108 or more profoundly, they recognise 
that some of these tools will have the potential to 
fundamentally alter the policing role and how policing 
operates, and with it, the relationship between police 
and the communities they serve. With that, there 
are opportunities for anti-racism campaigners and 
advocates to work with others who have expertise in 
technology to identify problems and have equality 
of arms when discussing them with the police. There 
might also be opportunities to work with police 
bodies who recognise that these technologies are no 
longer top-secret, and that they do not have the moral 
leadership nor technological expertise to devise by 
themselves the rules governing how and when new 
technology should be deployed. 
Finally, whilst technology may be used by police to 
gather information on citizens, it may also be leveraged 
by oversight bodies to ensure compliance with the law 
and anti-discrimination values. It should be possible 
for databases to be audited by oversight bodies to 
determine the profile of those whose information 
the police hold (ethnic breakdown, nationality, 
geographical location, etc.), and to consider whether 
there is any racial, ethnic or religious disparity. Audits 
could go further than just analysing the data holdings, 
by assessing how the police use the data, including 
assessing the breakdown of records that police search 
for, and whether there is the potential for racial disparity 
at the investigative stage, and at similar steps through 
the investigation process. Such analyses depend, 
however, on the availability of data disaggregated by 
race which differs according to approaches to racial and 
ethnic data collection across Europe.
Due to the lack of engagement, transparency 
and shared language to discuss these tools, 
there is little scope to discuss them across 
civil society, policing and academia, or even 
within the police themselves. Potentially, a 
consequence of this is the concealment of a 
reality that technological capabilities that 
drive policing practice may exacerbate racial 
disparities in the policing of racialised groups 
and communities across Europe. Further, 
there is also a very real concern that the use 
of technology in policing may make racialised 
criminalisation more difficult for anti-racist 
activists and campaigners to (quantitatively) 
evidence. In the absence of evaluation data 
or pilot results information to attest to the 
effectiveness of technology enabled policing, 
we must consider the future implications that 
data driven technologies in policing may pose 
for minority groups and communities.  
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ConClusIon
Racialised policing and ethnic profiling is an everyday experience for 
minority ethnic people, groups and communities across Europe. The 
emotional impact is painful, driving mistrust of the police and wider law 
enforcement agencies and disrupts notions of belonging and citizenship.  
The introduction of new technologies by police forces in recent years has 
raised significant questions around the extent to which these tools are 
further entrenching racial discrimination and criminal injustice. As we have 
considered throughout, technology is not neutral or necessarily scientifically 
objective and therefore, unless guarded against, it will exacerbate racial, 
ethnic and religious disparities in European justice systems.  
Whilst we welcome emerging (academic and political) 
debate and reflection on the accountability and 
ethics of technology advancement in public life, such 
debates must take into consideration the realities of 
racialised discriminatory policing practices, driven by 
stereotypical assumptions of minority ethnic people. 
This report resituates the use of police technology 
within the context of racial disparity and examines 
the implications of technological tools when used by 
police forces where institutional corporate memory 
drives the over-policing of racialised minority groups. 
There are today dubious policing practices across 
Europe as seen in the Netherlands, Belgium and the 
United Kingdom documented above, driven by the 
availability and misuse of technology - under the 
political guise of crime reduction, risk-identification 
and risk-management. Despite such pretentions, 
what is self-evident is that the potential for racialised 
policing to become hardwired, codified and concealed 
within police and law enforcement technology tools 
is alarmingly high, increasing further the reality 
of racialised criminalisation and the potential for 
wrongful convictions driving up the  disproportionate 
numbers of minority groups in prisons.
The lessons of history show that new technologies 
will continue to be attractive to police, and as data 
becomes easier to collect, and as the barriers to 
adoption fall, the use of such surveillance technology 
will become widespread. Further research, 
collaboration, and analysis is desperately needed to 
respond to these trends, to ensure that such practices 
are robustly challenged and mitigated against. There 
is evidently a need to develop rigorous monitoring 
processes to build European wide understandings of 
the utility and impact of police technology on minority 
groups and communities and to hold law enforcement 
agencies and technology companies to account for 
the consequences and effects of technology-driven 
policing. Further, it is hoped that such approaches 
serve to raise awareness for members of minority 
groups and communities of the often concealed 
policing strategies and technologies which continue to 
drive the over-policing of ‘suspicious’ communities.  
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reCommendAtIons For ACtIon
1. Challenging racialised 
criminalisation
Challenge and resist the use of stereotypical crime-
types and tropes used against negatively racialised 
communities. The encroachment of police technology 
is often presented and justified as a need to respond to 
the threat of ‘new’ forms of crime and criminal activity. 
By building collaborations of anti-racist campaigners 
and critical academics/researchers we can question the 
evidence base that informs such policing initiatives. 
2. Seek guidance to 
protect yourself
If you believe you are at risk or are being targeted 
by the police using some of the technologies listed 
above, consider seeking guidance, legal or otherwise, 
to help understand and assess what steps could be 
taken to improve your security. Guidance is available 
from a number of civil society organisations. This 
includes guides from the EFF https://ssd.eff.org/;  
Citizen Lab https://securityplanner.org/#/;  
and Access Now https://www.accessnow.org/help/.
3. Map what technologies 
are being deployed 
by police and law 
enforcement agencies
While many technologies being deployed by police 
will be secret (e.g. IMSI catchers), others will be 
publicly announced (e.g. mobile phone fingerprint 
scanners). Reports by oversight bodies, academics or 
think tanks can also provide rich information about 
what is being used. Mapping the technologies being 
deployed will allow individuals and communities to 
be better informed about how they are policed, and 
help build a Europe wide picture. 
4. Identify groups with 
technology expertise 
and build networks
Expertise on technology can help fill in gaps in 
official police explanations, and helps demystify 
how certain types of technologies are used. There 
are great European wide networks of digital 
rights groups,109 as well as academics110 working 
on these issues to build networks with, share 
information and experiences, and importantly to 
build resistance to and challenge racist policing. 
5. Use freedom of 
information laws or 
subject access requests
Through freedom of information laws it is possible 
to gather information on certain databases or 
types of technology that police are using. While 
there are robust exceptions to prevent police 
disclosing information, if you have questions 
you want answered, make inquiries as it is 
always worth trying. Likewise, if you think your 
information has been captured, and you’re on a 
police database, consider using subject access 
requests to find out what is held.
6. Organise
When police deploy new surveillance technology 
or build new databases, consider seeking 
representation on behalf of your community and 
ensure your voice is heard. Explore opportunities 
to make your case to technology companies who 
are building and deploying these tools as well. 
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Across Europe we are witnessing the increased use of technologies to 
assist policing and wider law enforcement practices. While some of these 
technologies are not new, law enforcement’s increased resort to data sharing 
and analytics, and predictive policing tools to direct policing resources has 
concerning implications for minority ethnic and marginalised communities.  
This report explains the potential effects of the increased use of data-driven 
technologies for minority groups and communities. The introduction of new 
technology is negatively impacting ethnic minority communities in three ways: 
1) the impact of new technologies to identify, surveil and analyse will be 
disproportionately felt by minority ethnic communities, as they are already 
over-policed; 2) many algorithmically driven identification-technologies 
disproportionately mis-identify people from black and other minority ethnic 
groups; and 3) predictive policing systems are likely to present geographic 
areas and communities with a high proportion of minority ethnic people as 
‘risky’ and subsequently, foci for police attention. 
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network combining racial equality advocacy with building a strong network 
of anti-racist organisations across Europe. We ensure that laws and policies 
address racism and reflect the experiences of racialised people. We provide a 
unique space for organisations to connect and exchange strategies on how to 
combat racism and support our communities.
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